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Abstract 
 
The issue of universality - how to ensure universal adherence to the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) – remains high on the agenda of the BWC member states. At the moment, 
there are still 27 states in the world that have not yet ratified or acceded to the BWC. 
Understanding why states refuse or are unable to join the Convention (or join the Convention 
only after a long time) can bring universality a step closer. In this thesis, I will look at reasons 
for state participation in or resistance to the BWC, in an effort to test to what extent New 
Liberalism can explain this participation or resistance.  
 
Central to liberal theories of international cooperation are factors of domestic politics. 
Liberals believe every state’s basis purposes and interests are shaped by the interdependent 
domestic and transnational society in which it is embedded. This thesis will therefore focus on 
factors of domestic politics that can help explain why states engage in arms control 
agreements such as the BWC or why they don’t do that.  
 
Factors of domestic politics include social values & identities regarding, for example, political 
ideology, the market position of domestic companies and the structure of domestic political 
representation. Also relevant are problems of bounded rationality, such as a limited span of 
attention or problems of uncertainty.  
 
In order to test New Liberalisms explanatory power, this thesis first looks at reasons for state 
participation or resistance that can be found in scientific and professional literature. Secondly, 
three small case studies are performed that look more closely at reasons of specific states: 
Israel, Haiti and Cameroon. 
 
The idea is not that this research will deliver conclusive results, but that it might produce 
inconclusive but nevertheless suggestive results that warrant further investigation through 
larger scale studies. 
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1. Introduction 
In an effort to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the international 
community developed a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction in 
1975. Better known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), this example of an 
international regime (I will also use the term “treaty regime”), contains ‘ a set of rules which 
govern state action in particular areas’ (Jackson and Sørensen 2003, p. 117). Together with 
other forms of international organizations such as NATO and the European Union, 
international regimes cover many aspects of international relations that might require some 
form of cooperation or coordination between states. Security issues such as the proliferation 
of weapons serve as a prime example of such cooperation in a need to guarantee stability, and 
national sovereignty in world system full of insecurities. 
 
One of the main questions in regime theory is the following one: how and when will states 
cooperate, i.e. form and/or join international regimes. In this thesis, I will look at international 
cooperation in arms control issues by studying state resistance to and participation in the 
Biological Weapons Convention. In other words: why do or don’t states join the regime to 
prevent biological weapons? 
 
This is an important question for the member states of the BWC. The issue of universality - 
how to ensure universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention – remains high on 
the agenda of the BWC member states1. At the moment, there are still 27 states in the world 
that have not yet ratified or acceded to the BWC. Understanding why states refuse or are 
unable to join the Convention (or join the Convention only after a long time) can bring 
universality a step closer. Without such universality of adherence to international regimes, the 
attractiveness for participants would severely diminish, making international cooperation all 
the more unlikely and endangering stability and security.  
 
The scientific relevance of this thesis lies in its testing of the explanatory power of one of the 
major theories of international cooperation, which is New Liberalism. Much has been written 
about this theory, and there have been some publications regarding the reasons why states do 
                                                
1 Universalization was, for example, one of the issues discussed during the 6th (2006) and 7th (2011) Review Conferences of 
the BWC 
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or do not join the BWC. However, New Liberalism has, as far as I know, not been tested on 
the case of the Biological Weapons Convention. Moreover, those reasons of states joining or 
not joining the BWC have not been compared to theory of international cooperation.  
 
In this thesis, I will first present my theoretical framework and introduce theoretical concepts, 
starting with the core assumptions of regime theory and moving on to those of New 
Liberalism and bounded rationality. This will result in the conceptual framework I will use for 
this thesis. Then, I will elaborate on my research method and the data I have used. Third I will 
elaborate on “general reasons” for states joining or not joining the BWC, based on scientific 
and professional literature, followed by three case studies. I will conclude this thesis with my 
analysis and concluding remarks.  
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2. Theoretical framework / concepts 1: regime theory 
 
Regime theorists study international regimes, in an effort to understand how cooperation can 
be achieved as well as sustained in a world full of sovereign states. Regime theorists believe 
cooperation is possible even in an anarchic system through the establishment of regimes. 
They study how and why regimes emerge, evolve and collapse, the extent to which regimes 
such as international institutions help advance cooperation and why states decide to join them 
(Keohane 2005, Haggard and Simmons 1987, Jackson and Sørensen 2003).  
 
In regime theory, two approaches are dominant. Realist approaches are based on the 
hegemonic stability theory. While there are realists that believe regimes such as international 
institutions are non-existent or at least irrelevant, since they do not have the power to shape 
state behavior (Stein 1993), others maintain that stable international institutions and 
international regimes can exist. According to Sitaraman (2009), the existence of a hegemonic 
power is a necessary condition for a regime’s emergence and development. Regimes will then 
be the ‘mere extensions of state interests’ (Sitaraman 2009, p. 37). According to the 
hegemonic stability theory, conditions of anarchy can even enhance international 
cooperation2. If a state becomes very powerful, ‘so powerful that it dominates all the other 
states in the system’ (Mearsheimer 1995, p. 86), this state (the hegemon) will exercise 
leadership in the world, either through persuasion, diplomacy or coercion and thus create 
stability. In other words: because of the concentration of international power in a hegemon, 
there is a strong compulsion for (other, weaker) states to “cooperate”. ‘Stability is (…) seen 
(…) as enhanced by a concentration of power in international politics: there is virtue in 
inequality among states’ (Viotti and Kauppi 2011, p. 73). At the same time, the absence or 
decline of hegemony as well as the presence of multiple (more than two) major powers will 
create disorder and chaos and the end of the hegemonic regime.  
 
The second dominant approach is an influential strand of the liberal school of thought: the 
neoliberal institutionalism of thinkers such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Neoliberal 
institutionalists claim that international institutions (regimes and/or international 
organizations) help promote interstate cooperation. One of their main purposes is to find out 
‘under what conditions institutional commitments are more or less likely to be kept’ (Keohane 
                                                
2 See for example Viotti and Kauppi 2011, p. 73 
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1995, p. 33). Another important question is why states are willing to enter into international 
institutional arrangements in the first place.  
 
According to Keohane, shared interests are fundamental to the formation of international 
regimes: ‘These interests may reflect the gains to be obtained from exploiting others other 
more effectively (…). But they may also be based on a mutual desire to increase the 
efficiency of the exchanges in which they engage (Keohane 2005, p. 79). The incentives to 
form international regimes will be greater when the issue density is high: when within a 
certain policy space the number and importance of issues is high, it is more likely that these 
issues are interconnected and so will agreements on these issues. In that case it will probably 
be more efficient to develop or join a regime than to stay with making ad hoc agreements. 
However, even when shared interests exist, cooperation frequently fails. This can happen, for 
example, when there is a collective action problem, when ‘self-interested individuals are 
likely to calculate that they are better off by not contributing, since their contribution is costly 
to them but has an imperceptible effect on whether the good is produced’ (Ibidem, p. 69). 
Cooperation can still occur, and is facilitated by two other factors. The first factor is a limited 
number of players that are in the lead. Their intensive interaction can help to substitute for the 
actions of a hegemon. And second: existing patterns of regimes: ‘the creation of new 
international regimes may be facilitated by the mutual confidence created by old ones’ 
(Ibidem, p. 79).  
 
Keohane believes international regimes and – institutions are valuable for states because they 
can enable ‘mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to 
attain’. Ad hoc agreements may suffice where issue density is low, but in other cases the 
forming of an international regime can be superior. This applies, as already mentioned, to 
situations in which issue density is high. Additionally, Keohane introduces three conditions 
‘at least one of which must apply if regimes are to be of value in facilitating agreements 
among governments’ (Keohane 2005, p. 154): 
1. a ‘lack of a clear legal framework establishing liability for actions’, for example the 
lack of a world government; 
2. ‘information imperfection’: information is costly and/or difficult to obtain. Regimes 
can be attractive to states if they provide specific information that states otherwise 
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would not be able to get or too costly to obtain. This is of value to states, because 
‘high-quality information reduces uncertainty’ (Ibidem, p. 160).  
3. ‘positive transaction costs’: costs such as organization costs and side-payments are 
often very high. 
 
In other words: for a regime to be of value to states, the costs of making ad hoc agreements on 
specific issues would have to be higher than the costs of discussing these issues within the 
context of a regime plus the costs of establishing or joining that regime. Also, international 
regimes can reduce uncertainty and risk by raising the costs of deception, ‘by linking discrete 
issues to one another and by improving the quantity and quality of information available to 
participants’,  (Keohane 1983, p. 161). States will have to make a rational decision whether or 
not to participate in a regime based on looking at the relationship between their interests and 
expected gains and costs. 
 
Regime theory and domestic politics 
As Keohane points out himself, his work has a weakness: ‘the theoretical discussions of After 
Hegemony treats states as units, without taking into account variations in domestic politics or 
in the ideals prevailing within them’ (Keohane 2005, p. xiii). In other words: in his theory 
there is no connection or interaction between domestic politics and international institutions. 
Obviously, he believes it is important to ‘rectify this omission’ (Ibidem). Apparently, he does 
not necessarily believe that regimes and institutions have a strong independent influence on 
state behavior, as structural realist would say. What is suggested is that he does believe 
domestic politics is important to a state’s decision whether or not to participate in an 
international regime. This is one of the core and distinctive assumptions of liberalism in 
international relations. Moravcsik believes this is a major strength of liberalism: because of 
this approach liberalism ‘provides a plausible theoretical explanation for variation in the 
substantive content of foreign policy’ (2010, p. 10), while realist, institutionalist and non-
rational approaches lack a persuasive account of this variation.  
 
Regime theory and arms control 
Looking at the costs and benefits of arms control agreements, several issues can be relevant 
for a state’s decision whether or not to join a treaty regime: 
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1. Verification / inspections & enforcement: are there any verification measures for the 
arms control treaty at hand and how strong are those measures? According to Michael 
Moodie (2009), many developing countries call for strong verifications measures for 
all arms control agreements. For some countries, ‘verification is a sine qua non for 
arms control’ (Moodie 2009, p. 161).  Thus, this could mean that states decide not to 
join an international treaty when they believe it doesn’t have a (/an effective) 
verification regime. The same goes for enforcement: how does the treaty address 
violations of the treaty? Some states might fear a robust enforcement regime because 
they have concerns about abuse (Pearson 2000). On the other hand can a weak 
enforcement regime undermine the arms control treaty as a whole and thus deter states 
from joining it. 
2. Provisions in the regime on technology access / dual-use technologies: Moodie speaks 
about the ‘often contentious dispute between developed countries and many 
developing nations regarding provisions in most arms control agreements that oblige 
states parties to provide cooperation and assistance in the promotion of relevant 
science and technology for peaceful purposes’ (2009, p. 161). Arms control treaties 
such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty include provisions that guarantee the right of all 
parties to use the technology at hand for peaceful purposes. This can be an important 
incentive for developing countries to join nonproliferation treaties. But these 
provisions can be subject to much debate. For example because more technologically 
advanced states try to restrict access to more advanced nuclear technologies, because 
they fear this might result in proliferation.   
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3. Theoretical framework / concepts 2: New Liberalism 
 
Basic assumptions  
Even though many other issues and actors are studied by international relations scholars, the 
study of international relations has traditionally focused on relations among and between 
states: why do nation-states go to war? What kind of international order can and should be 
built in the absence of a world government? Under what circumstances do states cooperate? 
The main contending theoretical traditions - realism (including neo- or structural realism), 
liberalism (including neoliberal institutionalism) and constructivism - offer different answers 
to such questions based on assumptions that are partly rather similar and partly different.  
 
Realists see international relations as a struggle for power between self-interested states. The 
believe states are the dominant actors and represent the key units of analysis in a world 
lacking a higher authority / world government, even though realists such as Kenneth Waltz 
and John Mearsheimer focus on the structure of the international system and what they 
believe is its central feature: anarchy (by which they usually mean a world without a 
centralized higher authority).  
 
The term (social) constructivism is usually used to describe theories that focus on ‘human 
awareness or consciousness and its place in world affairs’ (Jackson and Sørensen 2003, p. 
253). In other words: constructivists look at the role of ideas in international politics. They do 
acknowledge that material power and interests matter, but they believe they matter because of 
the ideas and beliefs behind them: ‘The claim is (…) that power and interests have the effects 
they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up.  Power and interest explanations presuppose 
ideas, and to that extent are not rivals to ideational explanations at all’ (Wendt 1999, p. 135-
136).  
 
While realists focus on power and conflict and have a rather pessimistic view on international 
relations, liberals are primarily focused on international cooperation and collaboration and the 
conditions under which these become possible. There are several strands of liberal thought3. 
Interdependence liberals, for example, are especially interested in economic ties of mutual 
exchange as well as mutual dependence. They believe the international economy has led to 
                                                
3 See, for example, Jackson and Sørensen 2003 
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more interdependence between states, reducing the risk of violent conflict between states. 
Institutional liberals, on the other hand, focus on the way international institutions help 
promote international cooperation. A third strand called republican liberalism (also known as 
the democratic peace theory) is built on the idea that democracies do not fight each other. In 
general, however, Viotti and Kauppi believe liberals share the following basic assumptions: 
 
1. Both state and non-state actors are important in global politics. For example: liberals 
believe transnational actors such as international organizations and multinational 
corporations can play role just as important as states. This is why ‘liberals prefer world 
or global politics rather than international politics’ (Viotti & Kauppi 2011, p. 129). 
Moravcsik (2010) emphasizes that liberals assume that social groups, both domestic 
and transnational, shape state preferences. Therefore, the state is not an unitary actor 
in the way realists claim; 
2. The second basic assumption is linked to the first one: (international) politics is 
embedded in a social context: factors at the state-society and individual level 
decisively constrain and affect the purposes and possibilities of governments, as well 
as international relations and outcomes (see also Moravcsik 1992, p. 7); 
3. The assumption of rationality: ‘state leaders and their domestic supporters engage in 
foreign policy for the instrumental purpose of securing benefits provided by (or 
avoiding costs imposed by) actors outside of their borders, and in making such 
calculations, states seek to deploy the most cost-effective means to achieve whatever 
their ends (preferences) may be’ (Moravcsik 2010, p. 2);  
4. Economic, social, cultural and political ties among state and non-state actors tend ‘to 
have if not a pacifying, then at least a moderating effect on state behavior’ (Viotti & 
Kauppi 2011, p. 130); 
5. Unlike realists, liberals think many other issues (environmental, economic, social) 
than just security are important in international politics; 
6. Liberals believe their key task is to explain under what conditions international 
cooperation can emerge, deepen and/or widen.  
 
Liberalism and international cooperation 
Liberals are much more interested in and optimistic about international cooperation or 
collaboration than realists. Not power and capabilities, but state preferences and interests are 
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central to liberal international relations theory. The consequence of emphasizing preferences 
and interests over power and security is that cooperation is much easier: states worry less 
about relative gains and more about absolute gains (Stein (1982) emphasizes that when states 
are trying to maximize relative gains, there are no common interests). It’s less about (security) 
advantages in comparison to other states and more about common interests and maximizing 
absolute gains for one’s own state. Thus, to liberals, cooperation between states can be 
perfectly rational: ‘when people employ their reason they can achieve mutually beneficial 
cooperation’ (Jackson and Sørensen 2003, p. 107).   
 
Liberals do recognize that states are self-interested and, at least to a certain extent, 
competitive. While liberals usually don’t use the word “anarchy”, they also recognize that 
there is no centralized higher authority in the international environment. However, they do not 
believe the absence of such an authority (and thus the anarchic world system) impedes 
international cooperation. On the contrary: ‘order emerges as self-interested actors coexisting 
in an anarchic environment reach autonomous and independent decisions that lead to mutually 
desirable cooperative outcomes’ (Stein 1993, p. 8).  
 
An important factor in liberal theories of international cooperation is domestic politics. 
Liberals believe every state’s basis purposes and interests are shaped by the interdependent 
domestic and transnational society in which it is embedded: ‘state-society relations (…) have 
a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics’ (Moravcsik 1997, p. 513).  
According to this approach, whether a state cooperates or not cannot be explained by system 
level studies that look at power, interests and institutions, ‘since this depends on the domestic 
political organization and the dominant internal social norms’ (Sitaraman 2009, p. 44).  
 
Moravcsik (2010) distinguishes between three broad categories of liberal theory: ideational 
liberalism, commercial liberalism and republican liberalism. Each of the three categories has 
its own ideas on what are the determinants in the domestic realm of state preferences and state 
behavior – and thus on the decision whether or not to engage in international cooperation in a 
certain field.  
 
Ideational liberalism 
Ideational liberalism states that domestic social values and identities are basic determinants of 
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state preferences. Social values are defined as ‘the set of preferences held by various 
individuals and groups in society concerning the proper scope and nature of legitimate state 
objectives’ (Moravcsik 2010, p. 6). Society will support the government if the government 
acts according to these social values or identity-based interests and creates legitimate 
institutions. Between and within nations, there can and will be different ideas on what these 
social values and legitimate institutions consist of: liberals reject the idea that ‘an automatic 
harmony of interest exists among individuals and groups in society: scarcity and 
differentiation introduce an inevitable measure of competition’ (Moravscik 1997, p. 517). 
Foreign policy of a state will reflect those societal concern and values of those societal actors 
that are successful in pressuring the government to pursue their goals through, for example, 
international cooperative efforts.  
 
Particularly important in ideational liberalism are preferences of society regarding national 
identity, political ideology and socioeconomic regulation. The first one, national identity, is 
all about the proper location of national borders: it has to do with beliefs ‘about the proper 
scope of the political “nation” and the allocation of citizens right within it’ (Moravcsik 2008, 
p. 241). Liberals argue there is greater potential for inter-state conflict if there is no “match” 
between patterns of political identity and existing borders, as has ‘been in the Balkans for 
over 100 years' or is the case in ‘Taiwan —the one jurisdiction where borders and national 
identity (…) are subject to competing claims’ Moravcsik 2010, p. 7).  
 
The second one, political ideology, has to do with social preferences pertaining to the nature 
of political institutions and the ‘commitment of individuals and groups’ (Moravcsik 1997, p. 
527), to these institutions. Conflict is more likely when, for example, there is a high degree of 
ideological distance among domestic regime types of states. This appears to have been the 
case during, for example, the Second World War and the wars of the French Revolution.  
 
The third dimension concerns preferences regarding the nature and scope of legitimate 
socioeconomic regulation and distribution: ‘The extent to which countries can cooperate to 
liberalize markets, for example, depends on the level of conflict or convergence of views 
about immigration, social welfare, taxation, religious freedom, families, health and safety, 
environmental and consumer protection, cultural promotion, and many other domestic public 
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goods’ (Moravcsik 2010, p. 7). 
 
Ideational liberalism and arms control 
Jennifer E. Sims  (2009) mentions several factors of domestic politics that are of importance 
for arms control agreements and that echo the assumptions of and factors belonging to 
Moravcsik’s three broad categories of liberal theory discussed in this paragraph: ideational 
liberalism, commercial liberalism and republican liberalism. 
 
The first category of factors she mentions is that of elites, interest groups and public opinions. 
In a democracy with freedom of speech and freedom of the press, many interests and interest 
groups can play a role in the domestic debate about arms and arms control. But even in a 
dictatorship, different interest groups within the government elite can have different and 
competing interests that are part of (a more secretive) debate. “Hawks” from the military 
might lobby for a very different position than representatives from the State Department or 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs. As was mentioned earlier, private industry can also play in 
important role in the debate. ‘Depending on the stakes involved and these groups’ 
organizational skills and recourses, a marketplace for ideas can emerge that results in 
imaginative and often controversial arms control solutions’ (Sims 2009, p. 85).  
 
Leaders (elites) from states could also have other interests than the national interest in mind 
when discussing arms control treaties. For example: striving for nuclear weapons (and thus 
not joining or violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty) to divert attention way from domestic 
issues instead of and to invoke nationalist sentiments and patriotism (Sagan 1996/1997). Ray 
Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations suggests, for example, that President 
Ahmadinejad of Iran and his followers see the debate over Iran's nuclear program as a 
welcome distraction from the internal turmoil that erupted after the disputed presidential 
election of 2009 (Takeyh, 2009). 
 
Another point that can be made here is about how states deal with security threats. Moravcsik 
points out that the difference between realism and liberalism is not that realist states are 
primarily concerned about national security and liberal states are not. ‘Both theories predict 
this under specific circumstances. Where the two families of theory genuinely differ is on the 
sources of security threats themselves, with realists attributing them to particular 
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configurations of power (against which states balance), whereas liberals attribute them to 
extreme conflict among ideological, institutional, and material preferences’ (Moravcsik 2010, 
p. 15). This point is also made in arms control theory, for example in literature on the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Sagan states that the acquisition of nuclear weapons ‘is 
likely to serve to parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actors 
within the state’ (Sagan, 1996/1997, p. 63). Leaders of states could develop nuclear weapons 
to distract public opinion from domestic problems and to invoke nationalist sentiments and 
patriotism. In other words: developing nuclear weapons is not about (or: not only about) the 
national interest of the state, but more about the interest of certain actors in the state such as 
political leaders, the bureaucracy or the army.  
 
Glenn Chafetz argues that the world can be divided into core states and periphery states 
(Ogilvie-White, 1996). The core states are liberal democracies with a shared set of values, 
sharing more or less the same political ideology. These states are much more inclined to 
cooperate and thus less inclined for to engage in a (nuclear) arms race. The periphery states 
are not liberal democracies, do not share norms and values and are therefore more likely to 
see each other as potential threats.  
 
Commercial liberalism 
In commercial liberalism, the domestic and global market position of domestic companies, 
employees and investors is the determining factor for a state’s international behavior. It states 
that ‘changes in the structure of the domestic and global economy alter the costs and benefits 
of transnational economic exchange, thus creating pressure on domestic governments to 
facilitate or block such exchanges through appropriate foreign economic and security policies’ 
(Moravcsik 2010, p. 8).  
 
High levels of trade interdependence, for example, will have a pacifying effect, because in 
‘complex and well-established transnational markets’ (Ibidem) it is usually more cost-
effective to accumulate wealth through trade than it is through war, sanctions and other 
coercive means. Thus, market actors may pressure their government to facilitate transnational 
and free trade and to maintain friendly relations with other states. There can also be pressure 
on domestic governments for protective measures, for example when ‘uncompetitive, 
monopolistic, or undiversified sectors or factors lose the most from liberalization and have an 
incentive to oppose it’ (Moravcsik 1997, p. 529). Should this lead to protectionism, they may 
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well be a source of international conflict.  
 
Commercial liberalism and arms control 
Sims’s second category of factors of domestic politics relevant to arms control agreement is 
that of prevailing economic and technological conditions. According to Sims, advancements 
in technology can complicate arms control and thus a state’s willingness to participate in arms 
control treaties. Commercials firms can produce advanced technologies that could be adopted 
by both the military and individual terrorists. Therefore, (constraints on the use and/or 
production) of these technologies could also be part of an arms control agreement. The 
question is then, whether a state considers it wise, feasible and desirable to put constraints on 
these dual-use technologies producing firms or not. Both Sims and Amitav Malik suggest that 
many technologically-advances states prefer not to put constraints on their domestic 
industries: ‘maintaining technological superiority over other nations, including friendly 
nations, continues to be an important aspect of safeguarding national security for most 
sovereign nations’ (Malik 2004, p. 124).  
 
Sims also speaks about the effects of economic conditions on decisions about arms control 
treaties: ‘in prosperous times, commercial industries may exercise their lobbying powers to 
dissuade political leaders from starting conflicts or rising tensions among trading partners’ 
(2009, p. 83). These industries are already active on a global level, doing business with 
partners abroad and wish their governments to do the same in a peaceful way. For example by 
participating in arms control talks.   
 
Republican liberalism 
Republican liberalism focuses on the structure of domestic political representation. It states 
that the mode of domestic politic representation matters, because that will determine whose 
preferences are institutionally favored. ‘A simple consequence is that policy tends to be 
biased in favor of the governing coalitions or powerful domestic groups favored by 
representative institutions—whether those groups are administrators (rulers, armies, or 
bureaucracies) or societal groups that "capture" the state’ (Moravcsik 2010, p. 9).  
 
Republican liberalism states that a government’s policy depends on which domestic groups 
are represented, which means that the form of government is relevant to foreign policy. It is 
for a reason that many scholars (e.g. Sitaraman 2009, Jackson and Sørensen 2003) state that 
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republican liberalism and the democratic peace theory are the same, even though Moravcsik 
does not., stating that ‘republican liberal theory thereby helps to explain phenomena as 
diverse as the "democratic peace", modern imperialism, and international trade and monetary 
cooperation’ (2010, p. 9).  
 
Moravcsik states that aggressive behavior is more likely in undemocratic and inegalitarian 
states than in democratic ones. The reason for this is that he assumes that individuals and 
groups are on the average rational and risk—averse, which means that ‘the more unbiased the 
range of domestic groups represented, the less likely they will support policies that impose 
high net costs or risks on a broad range of social actors’ (Moravcsik 1997, p. 531). In, for 
example, an autocracy or oligarchy, ‘privileged individuals can easily pass costs on to others’ 
(Ibidem), which makes it easier for those leading individuals to take risks in foreign policy. 
This doesn’t mean that democracies are always peaceful or that autocracies are always 
aggressive. What does follow from this is that ‘despotic power, bounded by neither law nor 
representative institutions’, tends to be wielded in a more arbitrary manner by a wider range 
of individuals, leading both to a wider range of expected outcomes and a more conflictual 
average’ (Ibidem, p. 532).  
 
Republican liberalism and arms control 
According to Jennifer E. Sims (2009), a state’s political en legal institutions for negotiating, 
concluding and sustaining arms control agreements matter for its decision whether or not to 
participate in arms control agreements. It is relevant what kind of political institutions in a 
state have what kind of power: ‘governments with strong executives tend towards greater 
flexibility and decisiveness in negotiations’, while ‘those with effective legislatures offer 
enhanced confidence in the durability of agreements even as they may bring delays in their 
ratification and implementation’ (Sims 2009, p 74).  In the United States, for example, the 
President can negotiate arms control agreements with foreign government, but the United 
States Senate has to approve the ratification of such agreements. So even though president 
Obama is in favor of the US joining the Arms Trade Treaty, the United States might never 
sign or ratify the treaty if he fails to convince the two-thirds majority of the Senate needed for 
approval. Already, many Senators have voiced their disapproval of president Obama’s 
position on the Arms Trade Treaty (Pecquet 2013).  
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4. Theoretical framework / concepts 3: bounded rationality 
 
In general, realism and liberalism in international relations have in common that they assume 
that states are rational actors4: states have a knowledge of alternatives, of consequences (the 
state either knows the consequences of alternative courses with certainty or knows the 
probability of possible outcomes) and, crucially, is able to compute which alternative is best, 
i.e. has the highest expected value (rational actors are optimizers)5.  
 
However, it does not seem very likely that states are always unified and rational. As Robert 
Keohane (2005, p. 110) puts it: ‘classical rationality is an idealization. It makes more sense to 
view individuals – and especially governments – as constrained in their abilities to make 
calculations’. Keohane is referring to problems of “bounded rationality”. Moravcsik (1997, 
2010) also mentions bounded rationality, but he does not really elaborate on the concept. 
 
The concept of bounded rationality is usually associated with the work of Herbert Simon. In, 
for example “A Behavorial Model of Rational Choice” (1955), Models of Bounded 
Rationality (first published in 1982) and Reason in Human Affairs (1983), the concept of 
bounded rationality plays an important role.  
 
According to Simon, theories of bounded rationality can be ‘generated by relaxing one or 
more of the assumptions of SEU [SEU = subjective utility, or rational choice, AS] theory’ 
(Simon 1997, p. 291). It is a variant of ‘rational choice that takes into account the cognitive 
limitations of the decision maker – limitations of both knowledge and computational capacity’ 
(Ibidem). Simon thus assumes two types of bounds on human rationality: not only are there 
limits on what individuals or states know, but also are there limits on the capacity to produce 
optima, i.e. to find out what is the best alternative with the best possible outcome. Therefore, 
they will choose an alternative that may not be optimal but will meet minimum requirements, 
the ‘satisficing alternative’ (Ibidem, p. 295): ‘A decision maker who chooses the best 
                                                
4 It is true that the role of reason within neorealism remains a little vague, given the assumption that the state system more or 
less determines actions. 
5 See for example Simon 1997, p. 291 
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available alternative according to some criterion is said to optimize; one who chooses an 
alternative that meets or exceeds specified criteria, but that is not guaranteed to be either 
unique or in any sense the best, is said to satisfice’ (Ibidem). 
 
Even though bounded rationality starts with the individual, (governmental) organizations can 
also be subject to bounded rationality: ‘The behavior of organizations mimics the bounded 
rationality of the actors that inhibit them’ (Jones 1999, p. 302). The question is, then, what 
kind of bounds or problems impede rational decision-making in organizations. The following 
problems (and factors, bounds) can be identified in literature on bounded rationality (for 
example Simon 1983, Simon 1997, March 1978, March 1994, Jones 1999, Jones 2002): 
1. A limited span of attention: ‘Decisions will be affected by the way decision makers 
attend (or fail to attend) to particular preferences, alternatives and consequences. They 
will depend on the ecology of attention: who attends to what, and when. Interested 
participants may not be present at a given decision because they are somewhere else. 
Something may be overlooked because something else is being attended to’ (March 
1994, p. 24); 
2. The limited capability of organizations to store and retrieve information; 
3. A lack of understanding: organizations misinterpret information, don’t see the 
relevance of information or don’t link information or are not able to see the right 
connections; 
4. Problems of communication: organizations have difficulties communicating 
information that is complex and/or specialized. March (1994, p. 10): ‘It is difficult to 
communicate across cultures, across generations, or across professional specialties’; 
5. Problems of uncertainty: a lack of reliable knowledge and information creates 
uncertainty about outcomes and consequences’. 
 
Clearly, these are all factors that can also have an impact on decision making within a state. 
Taking into account Keohane and Moravcsik’s statements regarding boundedly rational 
individuals, it seems to make sense to incorporate these factors of bounded rationality into the 
theoretical framework of this thesis.  
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5. Theoretical framework 4: domestic politics and foreign policy – factors 
 
Based on the previous theoretical paragraphs, a conceptual model can be constructed (see box 
1). The model summarizes the factors of domestic politics that are relevant for a state’s 
decision making on foreign policy and thus can help explain state participation in (and 
resistance to) international arms control agreements.  
 
Box 1 – New Liberalism, arms control agreements & factors of domestic politics 
Theory Factors - general Factors – arms control theory 
New Liberalism 
-Ideational 
Social values & identities – 
preferences, especially those 
regarding: 
• National identity 
• Political ideology 
• Socioeconomic regulation 
Elites, interest groups and public opinion  
preferences regarding, for example: 
• National security 
• Institution / regime: verification / 
inspections & enforcement provisions 
• Institution / regime: technology access / 
dual-use technologies provisions 
Prevailing technological conditions  affecting, 
e.g., preferences regarding a regime’s technology 
access / dual-use technologies provisions 
New Liberalism 
- Commercial 
Domestic and global market position 
of domestic companies 
Prevailing economic conditions  leading to, e.g., 
industrial lobbying 
New Liberalism 
-Republican 
Structure of domestic political 
representation 
Political and legal institutions 
Limited span of attention 
The limited capability of 
organizations to store and retrieve 
information 
A lack of understanding 
Problems of communication 
Bounded 
rationality 
Problems of uncertainty 
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6. Answering the research question - method 
 
This thesis will look at the following research question: 
 
To what extent can New Liberalism explain state resistance to and state participation in the 
regime to prevent biological weapons? 
 
‘State participation in the Biological Weapons Convention’ means that states either have 
ratified the BWC or acceded to the BWC. Signing the BWC is not the same as participating in 
a treaty, since it merely constitutes a preliminary endorsement of the BWC and still has to be 
followed by an official decision to ratify the BWC.  
 
I will try to answer the research question in two stages. First, I will look at “general” reasons 
for state participation in or resistance to the BWC that can be found in scientific and 
professional literature on the BWC and the proliferation of biological weapons. Secondly, I 
will perform case studies of several states that have either recently joined the BWC or haven’t 
joined the BWC (yet).  
 
On case studies 
A case study is ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger 
class of (similar) units’ (Gerring 2004, p. 342) and of ‘developing theory (…) regarding the 
causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases)’ (George and Bennett 2005, p. 
18). A unit can be seen as a phenomenon of scientific interest that is spatially bounded, for 
example a person, state or a revolution. It is observed at a single point in time or over a period 
of time (Gerring 2004).  
 
Case study methods have both advantages and limitations or even potential pitfalls. Gerring 
(2004) and George and Bennett (2005) identify several advantages of case study methods 
‘that make them valuable in testing hypotheses and particularly useful for theory 
development’ (George and Bennett 2005, p. 19). Case studies, for example, allow for the 
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consideration of contextual factors, for the inclusion of particular details and a more “holistic” 
approach. Flyvbjerg even goes as far as stating that ‘predictive theories and universals cannot 
be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is therefore 
more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals’ (2004, p. 423). Case 
studies also enable researchers to look more closely at causal mechanisms: ‘within a single 
case, we can look at a large number of intervening variables and inductively observe any 
unexpected aspects of the operation of a particular causal mechanism or help identify what 
conditions present in a case activate the causal mechanism’ (George and Bennett 2005, p. 21). 
Several cases might share the same outcome – for example states ratifying the BWC – but 
there can be several paths leading to this shared outcome, for example several explanations 
for states ratifying the BWC. Case studies can have value in identifying the different 
intervening variables leading states to such an outcome. 
 
George and Bennett (2005) mention several trade-offs, limitations and potential pitfalls of 
case studies.  One example of a trade-off is that between ‘the goals of attaining theoretical 
parsimony, establishing explanatory richness, and keeping the number of cases to be studied 
manageable’ (George and Bennett 2005, p. 31). Thus, it is imperative that case study 
researchers do not “overgeneralize” their findings. Another example is the relation tension 
between internal validity and external validity: the ‘tension between achieving high internal 
validity and good historical explanations of particular cases versus making generalizations 
that apply to broad populations’ (Ibidem, p. 22). A example of a limitation is that case studies 
can only to a certain extent make conclusions on how much a variable matters for a certain 
outcome, unless they include ‘a very well-controlled before-after case comparison in which 
only one independent variable changes’, or when ‘extremely similar cases differ only in one 
independent variable’ (Ibidem, p. 25). This will often not be the case. It will be, for example, 
very hard if not impossible to find two states – two cases – that are extremely similar, while 
such cases do not allow for well-controlled before-after case comparison.  
 
Case studies: states and the BWC 
In this thesis, I will conduct three small case studies – that is small qualitative studies on three 
states - looking at explanations for state participation in or resistance to the BWC. Thus, I will 
look at the question to what extent intervening variables, in this case domestic politics factors, 
can explain the outcome, which is a state’s participation or lack of participation in the BWC 
in the individual state at hand.  
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I believe a case study is appropriate for this thesis. As stated above, a case study enables me 
to look more closely at an individual state, taking into account contextual factors, looking at 
several intervening variables, including unexpected ones, at the same time and using a 
relatively broad range of sources. In my opinion, this a considerable advantage since this 
thesis is looking for explanations for an individual state’s position on the BWC as well as the 
lack of progress towards accession of or ratification in individual states. It is hard if not 
impossible to gain insight in causal mechanisms running decision making on BWC accession 
or ratification in an individual state without case studies.  
 
Naturally, one should also be careful in making generalizations based on the results of the 
case studies. If New Liberalism doesn’t seem to be able to explain resistance to the BWC in 
state A, that doesn’t mean New Liberalism cannot explain resistance to the BWC in other 
states B, C and D. And thus, it is not possible to make definitive conclusions on the extent to 
which New Liberalism can explain state participation in and resistance to the BWC. It should 
also be noted that it is not easy to gain insight in decision-making processes within individual 
states, even more so when regards national security issues. Considering both these points, it 
seems obvious that large-scale studies are needed in order to answer the research question and 
test hypotheses, for example by engaging in more large-scale case study research and 
comparative studies. That is not possible in the context of this thesis.  
 
What is possible, however, is to do a small-scale study that might result in ‘inconclusive but 
nevertheless suggestive results that warrant further investigation through larger scale studies’ 
(Fulton 2010, p. 682). This is Harry Eckstein’s concept of the plausibility probe: ‘plausibility 
probes involve attempts to determine whether potential validity may reasonably be considered 
great enough to warrant the pains and costs of testing, which are almost always considerable, 
but especially so if broad, painstaking comparative studies are undertaken’ (Eckstein 1992, 
pp. 147-148). Plausibility probes are usually studies on ‘relatively untested theories and 
hypotheses’ (George and Bennett 2005, p. 75). In general, liberal hypotheses have been tested 
in many ways, but I have not found any evidence that the credibility of liberal theory in the 
context of state participation in and resistance to the BWC has been tested. Therefore, I 
believe the plausibility probes used in this thesis can be a first step towards a more intensive 
and laborious testing of liberal theory in this context.  
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Case selection 
According to George and Bennett (2005), case selection should be based on two criterions. 
The first one is the ‘relevance to the research objective of the study’ (p. 83), which is in this 
case theory testing. The second criterion is that ‘cases should also be selected to provide the 
kind of control and variation required by the research problem’ (Ibidem). Since the objective 
of this thesis is to do a preliminary test of liberal theory in the context of the state 
participation in the BWC, I believe I should look for a collection of cases that includes both 
states that have recently joined the BWC and states that haven’t (yet). I also believe I should 
look at states from different regions for purposes of variation. If I would only select the cases 
of Israel, Syria and Egypt, for example, this thesis wouldn’t provide the variation required, 
since it seems clear that all three have to deal with more or less the same regional security 
dynamics of the Middle East. That could be the most powerful explanation for their resistance 
to joining the BWC. Therefore, states from other regions should also be part of this research.  
 
Based on these criteria I have selected the following cases: 
1. Israel 
2. Haiti 
3. Cameroon 
 
Sources and material used 
This research is primarily based on written data: (scientific) books, scientific articles, 
professional articles and reports. For example: reports on universalization activities by the 
Implementation Support Unit and the Chairman of the Biological Weapons Convention as 
well as from the BioWeapons Prevention Project, scientific literature on arms control and the 
BWC and other articles on websites such as that of the Arms Control Association, the 
Research Group for Biological Arms Control, The Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Council 
on Foreign Relations.  
 
It also includes sources on 37 states:  the 10 signatories, the 17 states that have neither signed 
nor acceded to the BWC and 10 states that have recently ratified or acceded to the convention 
– that is: in or after 2006. The year of 2006 was chosen at random for reasons of space and 
focus: given the requirements and time available for this thesis, it would not be possible to 
look at all 160 states that have ratified or acceded to the BWC. Moreover, coordinated 
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universalization activities of the BWC Party States started in 2006, which was the year of the 
6th BWC Review Conference. That means there is much more information available regarding 
state participation in and resistance to the BWC after 2006 than before. As mentioned before, 
it is not easy to gain insight in decision-making processes within individual states. Internal 
documents are, especially when it comes to security issues, often not publicly accessible, and 
reconstructing decision-making within governmental organizations without such documents is 
complicated. Moreover, it is often not clear where to look for information within 
governmental organizations. Thirdly, the quality and quantity of information varies among the 
37 states. I have tried to compensate for these difficulties by including a relatively broad 
range of sources. 
 
Regarding the theories of international relations and – cooperation I have looked a both 
primary sources from recognized scholars within the different theories and secondary sources.  
 
Since the research will include a relatively broad range of sources, it may lack the 
methodological precision of some other (more quantitative) studies. This may result in a 
somewhat impressionistic conclusion. However, I believe this is also a strength, since this 
method allows for a focus on the big picture. Moreover, since it is rather hard to find much 
information on the issue, a focus on just one kind of source would in my opinion be too 
narrow.  
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7. Why states don’t join the BWC  
In scientific and professional literature on The Biological Weapons Convention and 
proliferation of biological weapons, several general reasons can be found why states do not 
join the BWC.  
 
Proliferation motivations and the BWC 
One reason why states might not be not willing to join the BWC is an obvious one: because 
they have or are seeking to acquire a biological weapons capability and are thus not willing to 
bind themselves to a treaty outlawing that which they want to keep or acquire. Edward Spiers 
(2010) speaks about several proliferation motivations. Most motivations Spiers mentions have 
to do with national security and deterrence.  
 
First, developing a biological weapons capability ‘may serve as a deterrent in its own right’ 
(p. 95), just like the development of a chemical weapons capability served as a deterrent for 
the main adversaries during the World War II. In World War II, all major powers developed 
chemical weapons as a deterrent to their use, and the Allied forces as well as Germany and 
Italy adopted no-first-use policies. There is no record of the use of chemical weapons by any 
power, except for Japan (Brown 2009). Kellman (2007) points out that there is a difference 
between nuclear deterrence and biological weapons deterrence, since no state is openly 
pursuing or producing biological arms: ‘In contrast to nuclear weapons programs, 
bioweapons’ deterrent effect derives from innuendo and suspicion, not from brandishing 
armaments’ (p. 68). Therefore, he has doubts whether states see biological weapons as an 
effective deterrent against states with (other) weapons of mass destruction.  
 
Spiers suggest a biological weapons capability may serve as a cheaper and simpler alternative 
to a nuclear deterrence. Some states – Spiers mentions Britain, the United States and India – 
saw or see the development of a biological and/or chemical weapons capability as a ‘stepping-
stone towards the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability’ (p.95). Once these states have 
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nuclear weapons that can serve as a stronger deterrent against foreign adversaries, they may 
be willing to get rid of their biological weapons arsenal. Even after declaring a biological 
weapons program and committing to its dismantling, a state’s knowledge about the production 
of these weapons might still serve as a deterrent.  
 
To states that cannot afford nuclear weapons or lack the knowledge, for example several 
states in the Middle East, biological weapons can be seen as necessary ‘to deter local 
adversaries’ (Spiers 2010, p.95) in regional conflicts (Kellman 2007). They might not disarm 
in any category of weapons of mass destruction as long as their adversaries won’t do the 
same. Moreover, developing countries facing a threat from a much larger and/or adversary 
‘might simply be impressed by the military utility of chemical or biological weapons’ 
(Ibidem, p. 95). Iraq, for example, might have considered the use of chemical weapons as the 
answer against attacks by the much larger Iranian army, that used human wave attacks (Spiers 
2010, Ekeus 2003). According to Takeyh (2006), ‘the principal strategic utility of chemical 
weapons is to terrorize the combatants and demoralize the population. Saddam was successful 
in this regard’ (p. 172).  
 
A second motivation for developing a biological weapons capability is that ‘states may desire 
chemical or biological weapons to counter insurgency operations’ (Spiers 2010, p. 96). States 
could use biological weapons because they can be effective against indigenous populations 
that lack the means to battle diseases. In the 1980s South Africa, for example, had the ‘South 
African Project Coast [that, AS] produced weapons that were not designed for use against an 
adversary with comparable military power but for use against the indigenous majority’ 
(Kellman 2007, p. 68).  
 
Thirdly, states might want to acquire biological weapons simply because they can. It is 
relatively easy to produce biological agents rapidly: ‘anthrax bacteria can be produced from 
seed culture in 96 hours, and (.....) the relevant materials can be obtained from natural 
sources’ (Spiers 2010, p. 94). Moreover, pharmaceutical plants and large laboratories can 
easily be converted to produce biological agents (Spiers 2010, Guillemin 2005). However, 
according to Kellman (2007) doubts whether or not this claim is (still) valid today, pointing 
out that there is a big difference between ‘what could be and what is’: ‘What purpose would 
such weapons achieve? Just because a weapon can be easily, safely and cheaply built does not 
answer whether it is worthwhile to do so’. He believes there are many disadvantages for states 
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with offensive biological weapons programs, due to the universal taboo against biological 
weapons. Another comment is that while it is relatively easy and cheap to produce biological 
weapons, actually deploying them in an effective way in an attack is much harder. Changing 
winds and sunlight, for example, can render several biological weapons ineffective. Also, a 
state’s own troops and citizens might be at risk (Kellman 2007). 
 
It should be pointed out that only a few of the states that haven’t signed, acceded to or ratified 
the BWC have been alleged to be of biological weapons concern, namely Egypt, Syria and 
Israel (Beard 2007, Kellman 2007), that ‘not a single State admits to having a bioweapons 
program, and there is no proof that any State is, in fact, preparing to commit bioviolence’ 
(Kellman 2007, p. 66). According to Kellman, Syria is one of the leading suspects of having 
an active biological weapons program, just like Iran and North Korea (two states that have 
joined the BWC), even though ‘as many as ten States might have active bioweapons 
programs’ (2007, p. 69).  
 
Biological Weapons Convention unattractive? 
Beard (2007) mentions several other factors why states don’t join the BWC. These factors 
have to do with the regime itself: it is too unattractive to some states and thus those state are 
not motivated to take the necessary steps towards accession or ratification. In the words of 
McLaughlin: ‘the Convention has not yet been successful in providing non-member States 
with persuasive motivation for joining’ (2009, p. 65). 
 
The first reason why the BWC could be unattractive to possible new members because of its 
lack of effective compliance measures, and because they see no prospect for serious reform of 
the BWC. This can be a problem, since states are expected to forego military capabilities, 
such as biological weapons, and they are more likely to agree to that if they can trust that 
other states will do the same. But how can you trust other states to do the same without a 
mechanism to verify state compliance? The BWC doesn’t have such a mechanism, which is 
why ‘cheater retain maximum technological flexibility and political deniability’ (Kellman 
2006, p. 205).  In a working paper on the universality of the BWC (2006), the Republic of 
Korea – after consulting with Japan, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Norway and New 
Zealand, also mentions the perceived lack of effectiveness of the regime as a reason for states 
not join the BWC.  
 
 30 
In the past, the BWC ‘has been flagrantly violated’ (“Biological Weapons Convention”, 
2012). The Soviet Union maintained a substantial biological weapons program after ratifying 
the BWC, while in Iraq the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) discovered a 
program in 1995 even though Iraq was a signatory state at the time (“Iraqi Biological 
Weapons Program”, 1998).  Concerns have also been raised by, for example, the United 
States about compliance by Libya, Iran, North Korea and Cuba - all State Parties - as well as 
by Syria, a Signatory State. So far, these (suspected) violations have not led to any 
coordinated strengthening measures. In the 1990s, after ‘the BWC’s weaknesses were 
exposed by the Soviet and Iraqi bioweapons program’ (Kellman 2007, p. 194), an Ad Hoc 
Group of the State Parties to the BWC was asked to make specific recommendations on 
effective verification measures in order to strengthen the BWC. For about ten years the 
development of and negotiations on a new Protocol with verification measures took place, but 
in the end no agreement was reached. The United States under president George W. Bush was 
the most outspoken opponent of the new Protocol (Kellman 2007, van der Bruggen and ter 
Haar 2011). Today, as Kellman states it, ‘the BWC has been relegated to the status of an 
infirm elderly relative worthy of affection and respect yet not really expected to meaningful 
answers to current challenges’ (2007, p. 193). Non-Party states that share this view might 
think twice before joining the BWC. 
 
The second reason why the BWC might be unattractive is because states fear joining the 
regime might limit their access to health sciences and biotechnology. Especially developing 
states may see the BWC as having ‘a discriminatory impact on their access to (….) vaccines, 
diagnostic equipment, advanced biotechnology, and various pharmaceutical products’ (Beard 
2007, p. 311). Beard believes it is because of the regime’s indeterminate provisions that Non-
Party States. While, for example, developing states have the right under article X of the BWC 
‘to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for 
peaceful purposes’, ‘in practice the developed industrial states have used the indeterminate 
conditional phrase “for peaceful purposes” in that article to justify the imposition of whatever 
(…) restrictions they deem appropriate on the transfer and export of dual-use materials, 
technology, and information’ (Beard 2007, p. 312).  
 
Van der Bruggen and ter Haar (2011) believe the key to achieving universalization is to make 
the BWC more attractive to non-Parties by strengthening it. Just like Beard, they believe it 
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can help to express the ‘commitment in Article X to promote cooperation for peaceful 
purposes (…) in more concrete terms’ (p. 148). They also think it should be made less 
attractive to stay outside of the BWC by ‘installing controls for export of BW-relevant 
technology for non-Parties’ (p. 148). In other words: they too believe joining the BWC can be 
unattractive to non-Parties because of the regime’s indeterminate provisions while staying out 
of is, in a way, too attractive. The Republic of Korea also has these concerns: it believes the 
BWC might lack incentives for participation and fears that states believe that ‘the cost of 
implementation remains higher than the cost of not joining’ (‘Working Paper’ 2006, p. 2). 
 
A related issue with the BWC has to do with what Kellman calls the Biodefense Dilemma: 
‘may a government engage in bioresearch in order to devise protective measures against 
biothreats if that research has direct and obvious potential for a bioweapons program?’ (2007, 
p. 207). One the one hand, states want to protect their citizens against attacks with biological 
agents, either by hostile states or by terrorist groups. One way to do that is by developing a 
biodefense program: research on vaccines and other protective measures. On the other hand, 
states might fear other states’ biodefense programs because of their potential for biological 
weapons programs. Research into the workings of biological weapons, for example into the 
workings and application of anthrax, can be part of a biodefense program but its results can 
also be very relevant for an offensive weapons program. Even if a state has no intention to use 
the results of its biodefense program or research in the private sphere for a bioweapons 
program, there is the risk of misuse by other states or terrorist groups. The problem is that the 
BWC ‘has sidestepped a precise definition of what a bioweapons is’ (Kellman 2007, p. 208) 
and that there are no clear mechanisms that balance two seemingly opposing: transparency 
and secrecy. Transparency about biodefense activities is needed to build confidence that a 
state’s biodefense program is not a cover for an offensive program. Secrecy might be 
important for parts of a biodefense program because states want to prevent research results 
being used for harmful purposes.  
 
Lack of awareness & misunderstandings 
McLaughlin (2009) mentions several factors that have to do with a lack of awareness of and 
accurate information on the BWC, especially in countries without ‘sophisticated or reliable 
communication systems’ (p. 66). Prior to the 6th Review Conference of the BWC in 2006, 
there have been no concerted efforts to raise awareness of the Biological Weapons 
Convention. Several countries came into existence or gained independence after the BWC 
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entered into force in 1975, which probably means they haven’t been made aware of the BWC 
before 2006. Those states that were interested but needed more information didn’t always 
know where to get it because of the ‘low level of institutionalization (Working Paper 2006, 
p.2): there was no permanent secretariat or support unit before 2006, when the 6th Review 
Conference decided to create the Implementation Support Unit. Another problem can be that 
state officials do not know how to deal with the BWC within their own government and 
bureaucracy. The result of which can be that some States just give up and turn their attention 
to other issues.  
 
A result of this lack of awareness and information that also prevents states from joining the 
BWC is that there can be misunderstandings about the regime. States, for example, don’t 
know the difference between the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. Another example is that states believe there is no need to join the BWC because 
they don’t have, never had and never pursued a biological weapons program. 
 
The lack of awareness seems to play a role in several states. Representatives of Myanmar and 
Nepal have both signaled a lack of awareness in their country about the BWC.  Most of the 
small island states in the Pacific (Kiribati, Micronesia, Nauru, Nieu, Samoa, Tuvalu) also 
seem unaware of the BWC. Letters from State Parties or NGOs have been left unanswered 
(e.g. Tuvalu, Kiribati) and participation by states in BWC workshops have not led to any 
progress or feedback (e.g. Micronesia, Nauru) (“Report of the Chairman” 2007, 2008, 2010, 
2012, “Status of Universalization” 2011). It should be noted that several of these states – 
Kiribati, Samoa and Tuvalu - are among the least-developed countries in the world. This 
could mean they have other priorities and concerns than joining the BWC. 
 
Joining and implementation costs / problems of capacity 
States that are either poor, small or both may see the (financial) costs for joining and 
implementing the BWC as too big a burden. States that join the BWC commit themselves to 
legally binding obligations but also to several measures to promote the implementation of the 
BWC in an effective way: for example the designation of national contact points, submitting 
reports containing information on the national implementation of Article X and Confidence-
Building Measures (CMBs) such as the annual exchange between the State Parties of 
information regarding biodefense programs, outbreaks of infectious diseases and past 
offensive programs. Implementing and executing these measures as well as preparing and 
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implementing new legislation can be a time-consuming business, and thus states that join the 
BWC are asked to invest both a significant amount of time and money. (McLaughlin 2009, 
van der Bruggen and ter Haar 2011). This might prevent states from joining the BWC: ‘In 
combination with the high number of other security concerns that require ratification and 
implementation, this places a high resource burden on the administration of countries’ 
(McLaughlin 2009, p. 66).  
 
Other political priorities 
If states don’t think that biological weapons pose a real threat and they are confronted with 
other security issues, they might choose not to join the BWC and focus their time and effort 
on these other security issues. Moreover, there are many reasons why other issues than 
national and international security can dominate the national agenda, making it harder to get 
the BWC on top of it. Developing states might have more pressing priorities such as health 
care, education, the economy, jobs and technical development (Beard 2007, McLaughlin 
2009).  Guyana, for example, is a Signatory State that seems to have other priorities than the 
BWC: Guyana has never attended any formal BWC meeting and indicated that other issues 
were perceived as more pressing, giving Guyana’s limited human and financial resources’ 
(“Report of the Chairman” 2008). 
 
Constitutional & organizational difficulties 
Another reason that – like other political priorities - has to do with domestic politics is what 
McLaughlin (2009) calls constitutional and organizational difficulties. Internal political 
events, such as elections leading to a new government or new political issues suddenly 
dominating the parliamentary agenda, can result in the process of joining the BWC being 
delayed or stalled.  
 
Both Myanmar and Nepal have stated their intention to ratify the BWC, but these processes 
are slowed down because of constitutional and organizational difficulties. Myanmar is in a 
process of democratic transition since the 2010 general elections (Kipgen 2013), which 
involves many changes that need priority. In 2011 Myanmar stated its government is 
reviewing 360 items of legislation, including legislation needed for ratification of the BWC. 
Nepal is currently working on a new national constitution and, since the negotiations on this 
new constitution have failed, expecting new elections in 2013 (“Nepal Calls Elections” 2012). 
It has stated it will bring the BWC to its parliament once work on the new constitution is 
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complete. (“Report of the Chairman” 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, “Status of Universalization” 
2011). 
 
Another problem can be that within state ‘there is no logical department or agency in place 
with whom to lodge responsibility for the BWC’ (McLaughlin 2009, p. 67), resulting in 
endless debate within a government bureaucracy and thus in no progress being made towards 
accession to or ratifying the BWC. This is or has been the case in Tanzania and Cameroon.  
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8. Why states do join the BWC  
 
In scientific and professional literature on the BWC several reasons can be found why states 
do join it. The most dominant explanation for state participation in the BWC has to do with 
international norms and the taboo against the use and possession of biological weapons.  
 
International norms & the biological weapons taboo 
Much is written about the international norm against biological weapons. ‘Most nations have 
embraced the norm that deems these weapons morally repugnant’ (Cole 1998). ‘The taboo 
against the use of Biological weapons goes back a long way in history. This stigma is 
reflected in the international efforts to prevent any individual from becoming a victim of 
biological weapons through a number of treaties over the last 150 years’ (Ilsa 2007 p. 37). 
Sitaraman speaks about the ‘commonly shared prohibitive norms against the use of’ 
biological (and chemical) weapons (2009, p. 80).  
 
The Biological Weapons Convention is generally seen as the codification of the taboo against 
biological weapons, even though its ‘weak participation brings little legitimacy and 
importance to its obligations’ (Ilsa 2007, p. 40). Therefore, not being a party to the BWC can 
be seen as problematic for a state’s reputation and relationship with other states. According to 
McLaughlin, ‘not being seen as a ‘weak link’ in the global non-proliferation or constituting a 
‘safe haven’ for non-state actors and being inadvertently responsible for the spread of disease 
is a persuasive driver for States to join the BWC’ (2009, p. 68).  
 
It is clear that the efforts by the State Parties to the BWC to convince Non-Party States to join 
are mainly based on this argument. Paul van den IJssel, who, as the president-designate of the 
2011 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, had a special responsibility for the 
universalization of the BWC, stated that he didn’t any ‘good reason [to refrain from joining 
the BWC] because then you don’t subscribe to the norm’ (Meier 2011). His predecessor 
Masood Khan from Pakistan mentioned that joining the BWC ‘will lead to international 
recognition’ (Khan 2007, p. 72) and stressed that ‘the struggle against them [biological 
weapons AS] must (…) be shared across the international community’ (Ibidem, p. 71). In a 
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paper submitted to the 6th BWC Review Conference, several Latin-American states underline 
the ‘importance of promoting international cooperation’ as an incentive to achieve 
universality and the need to ‘strengthen the norm that prohibits the use of biological weapons’ 
(‘Universalization’ 2006, p. 1).  
 
Other reasons why states join the BWC have to do with security concerns and (perceived) 
benefits from technological exchanges and cooperation between states party to the BWC.  
 
Other reasons – security 
Biological weapons are considered to be weapons of mass destruction, can have ‘devastating’ 
economic effects (Khan 2007, p. 71), can not only be used against humans but also against 
livestock and crops and are relatively easy to develop, transfer and conceal. These are all 
reasons why states can believe it is their interest of their national security to combat biological 
weapons and do all they can to reduce the risks that outcomes of life sciences research will be 
misused. Joining the BWC – even though one can name many reasons why it is not that 
attractive – is one way of doing that and maybe the most important way to do that on an 
international scale.  
 
There are two reasons why the threat posed by biological weapons can be perceived to be 
more serious today. First, accelerating advances of bioscience create more possibilities to 
commit bioviolence (Kellman 2007). 
 
Secondly, ‘there is a growing risk that biological weapons may be obtained and used by non-
state actors, including terrorist groups’ (Khan 2007, p. 71). According to Cronin (2003) and 
Interpol Secretary General Ronald K. Noble (Kellman 2007), there are several reasons for 
increased potential use of biological weapons by terrorist groups. First, there is evidence that 
terrorist groups have a strong interest in using biological weapons and are planning to do so. 
Secondly, as biotechnology industries continue to expand, more information on biological 
agents and stockpiles are available. A third reason is ‘the growth of militant religious groups 
with political agendas as a percentage of all terrorist groups’ (Cronin 2003, p. 2). And finally 
the internationalization of the threat of terrorism increases the risk: terrorist groups are much 
less bound by geographical constraints, have more options for recruitment and can basically 
strike in almost any part of the world.  
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Joining the BWC increases possibilities for cooperation and information exchange on these 
security issues among State Parties, supported by the Implementation Support Unit.  
 
Other reasons – benefits from technological exchanges 
Another reason for states to join the BWC that is frequently pointed out is that State Parties 
can benefit from technological exchanges. Khan (2007) mentions Article X of the BWC when 
stating that the BWC ‘supports the development of the peaceful uses of biological science and 
technology (2007, p. 71) and can strengthen public health care, agriculture and emergency 
management. According to McLaughlin many states are especially interested in these 
benefits, even though she points out that more attention is needed to ‘demonstrate some 
concrete gains that joining the BWC offers’ (2007, p. 68). The papers already mentioned in 
this thesis by the Republic of Korea (2006) and several Latin-American states (2006) also 
point out the same possible advantages for states joining the BWC.  
 
Thus, even though some states may think the BWC is not that attractive because of its lack of 
technological or economic incentives of participation, other states may have a different view 
and, for example, consider the regular meetings between State Parties that facilitate 
information exchange and support by other State Parties as reason enough to join.  
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9. Case studies 
 
Israel 
Israel has neither signed nor acceded to the BWC. However, Israel has been granted the 
observer status during the Fourth BWC Review Conference in 1991. Representatives of the 
state have attended several BWC meetings, including meetings on the issue of 
universalization, for example a universalization meeting in Geneva in 2011, EU Joint Action 
preparatory meetings in Brussel, Geneva and New York and a EU Joint Action regional 
seminar for the Middle East in 2008. During these meetings and in letters to the Chairman of 
the BWC, Israel has states several times that regional circumstances are the reason why Israel 
is not joining the BWC.   
 
Much has been written about the unstable and complicated situation in the Middle East region 
that comes with many security concerns and that complicates universalization efforts in the 
region. Usually, the case of Israel and the BWC is linked to the cases of Syria and Egypt, two 
states in the Middle East region that have signed but not ratified the BWC. According to Paul 
van de IJssel from the Netherlands, who – being the president-designate of the 2011 Review 
Conference – spoke to several states in the Middle East about joining the BWC, the position 
of Israel, Egypt and Syria is slightly different from other Non-Party States, for several 
reasons.  
 
First of all, several states in the Middle East are suspected of having an offensive biological 
weapons program as well as other weapons of mass destruction. As mentioned before, Syria is 
one of the leading suspects of having an offensive biological weapons program, and Israel and 
Egypt have been alleged of having a biological weapons program, too. German, Israeli and 
American sources have stated that Syria has or probably has biological weapons, while a 
Swedish Defense Agency has found no evidence of an offensive or even defensive program 
(“Syria” 2013). Recently, there have been many reports in the press regarding the use of 
chemical weapons by the Syrian army in Syria’s civil war (e.g. Watkins and Vandoorne 
2013). There exists no consensus on the status of Israel’s offensive biological weapons 
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programs, but Israel does publish defensive research on biological agents (Guillemin 2005). 
Israel has made allegations that Egypt is doing research to develop biological weapons, but in 
general most experts do not believe Egypt has the necessary means to develop or produce 
biological weapons (“Egypt” 2013). Iran should also be mentioned, because of its suspected 
activities regarding nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, even though so far there does 
not seem to be conclusive evidence to back up these suspicions (“Iran” 2013).  
 
Secondly, Israel as well as Syria and Egypt ‘link the behavior of other states to whether they 
will join the BWC’ (Meier 2011). ‘Considerable evidence suggests that a variety of defensive 
and deterrent motivations may inform the preferences of states there with respect to biological 
weapons (Beard 2007, p. 292). Israel is very concerned about the current regional situation 
and threats posed by both states in the region and terrorist organizations using weapons of 
mass destruction. Therefore, Israel has declared that it would only consider discussions on the 
BWC and other regimes (NPT, Chemical Weapons Convention/CWC) after the establishment 
of ‘confidence building measures, good neighbourliness, and regional security frameworks’ 
that would be the start of  ‘a gradual regional process’ (Friedman 2009, p. 48).  Syria, 
officially is still at war with Israel, and Egypt have done the same (“Status of 
Universalization” 2011). 
  
The second issue (which is linked to the first issue) in the Middle East is the link between 
biological weapons and de BWC on the one hand, and the NPT en CWC and nuclear weapons 
and chemical weapons on the other hand. Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons 
while other states such as Syria and Egypt don’t posses nuclear devices. According to Beard, 
‘the legacy of several conflicts’ involving the use of weapons of mass destruction in the 
Middle East has created ‘the strategic perception that the best deterrent against such weapons 
[weapons of mass destruction, AS] is the ability to launch an in-kind response’ (2007, p. 292). 
In other words, regional rivals such as Israel and Syria will want to at least suggest that they 
are able to deploy weapons of mass destruction in order to deter to other state from attacking 
or sponsoring an attack with WMDs. What follows is that states that do not possess nuclear 
weapons will focus on other WMDs like biological weapons. This could be an explanation 
why Syria might be interested in or having a biological weapons program. 
 
However, Israel’s position on the BWC is not necessarily exclusively linked to Syria and 
Egypt’s position and behavior. Israelis consider the Iranian nuclear threat as the most serious 
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one facing them. Two thirds of the respondents of a poll done in 2012 gave this threat a score 
of 7, the highest score on the scale. The second most serious the threat is that of enemy states 
gaining possession of chemical and biological weapons with an average score of 5.9. These 
results are almost identical with those reported in 2007 and 2009, indicating a consistent 
perception over time. When asked what Israel should do if Iran achieves a military nuclear 
capability, 78% of the respondents maintained that Israel should maintain its nuclear weapons 
even if that meant Iran would develop and maintain nuclear weapons. Moreover, 62% of the 
Israelis oppose the proposal to declare the Middle East region an area free of weapons of mass 
destruction (Ben Meir and Bagno-Moldavsky 2013). While these are just polls and 
preferences can change over time, these numbers do indicate the public opinion in Israel is 
very concerned with national security and that there is widespread support for Israel’s 
(alleged) possession of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Friedman (2009) speaks about states in the region that ‘are not at peace with Israel, and even 
threaten its existence’ (p.48), pointing out that some of these states have signed and ratified 
the Biological Weapons Convention. The problem is, according to Friedman, on the one hand 
intelligence data suggests that these states have weapons of mass destruction, while on the 
other hand the BWC (and other arms control regimes) seems incapable of preventing this, 
even in states that have ratified the BWC. Thus, ‘in the current situation, where the 
convention has no effective verification mechanisms, it cannot guarantee that these states do 
not possess BW (biological weapons)’ (Ibidem). Moreover, Israel fears the threat of terrorist 
organizations and does not seem to believe that international arms control regimes can be very 
effective in preventing these organizations from developing, procuring and using weapons of 
mass destruction.   
 
While representatives Israel have repeatedly stated that Israel (more or less) support the aims 
and objectives of the BWC it does seem true it does not seem likely that Israel will join the 
BWC in the near future (Friedman 2009, “Status of Universalization” 2011). 
 
Haiti 
 
Haiti is the poorest country of the Western Hemisphere and is listed the United Nations’ list 
of least-developed countries. Since gaining independence in 1804, the country has been 
subject to much political violence and unrest, instability, poverty and environmental 
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degradation.  
 
Haiti signed the BWC in 1972, but hasn’t ratified it yet. However, following bilateral 
discussions on the subject with Canada and Brazil, it has recently shown interest in ratifying 
the BWC (“Report of the Chairman” 2009, “Status of Universalization” 2011). Since 2003, 
Haiti has participated in several BWC meetings, including the 6th Review Conference of 2006 
and an awareness raising and universalization seminar in 2008.  
 
However, several problems complicate Haiti’s ratification of the BWC. First, even though 
representatives have expressed interest in the BWC, awareness in Haiti was relatively low. In 
2008, Haitian diplomats pointed out that they still needed to raise awareness in their own 
country, and that their own Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not really see the need to ratify the 
BWC given other priorities and problems in Haiti (Report of the Chairman” 2007, 2008).  
 
Second, Haiti didn’t have the resources and personnel to ratify the BWC. In 2007 and 2008, 
Haiti repeatedly requested assistance from other State Parties, but it took some time before 
that assistance came (“Haiti” 2009). In 2009, Canada had several meetings with Haiti on 
ratification of the BWC, resulting in some progress.  
 
Third, even after the Haitian government seemed to be aware of the BWC and ready to ratify 
it, the earthquake of January 2010 halted the process of ratification (“Report of the Chairman” 
2008). The Haitian government indicated in 2011 it was ready to continue the process 
(“Report of the Chairman” 2012). Haiti has already ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, this happened when ratification of the CWC received parliamentary approval in 
2006.  
 
Cameroon  
 
Cameroon is not on the United Nations list of least-developed countries, but its ‘economic 
development has been retarded by economic mismanagement, persuasive corruption, and a 
challenging business development’ (“Cameroon” 2009, p. 26).  
 
While Cameroon was not among that states that signed the BWC when it entered into force, 
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reports confirm that its accession process had begun in 2007, following several 
universalization activities by State Parties such as France, the United States and the United 
Kingdom (“Report of the Chairman” 2008, 2009, 2010) and Haiti’s participation in several 
BWC meetings such as EU Joint Action preparatory meetings in Brussels and New York in 
2006. A draft law had been prepared in 2007 by the Ministry of Justice, which was to be the 
start of the accession process. It was pointed out, however, that accession was unlikely before 
early 2008 because of the close of the Parliamentary sessions (“Cameroon” 2009, p. 26).  
 
Following a review of the draft law by the Ministry of Defense and advice by the Ministry of 
Environment and Protection of Nature, the President of Cameroon – who has a strong 
positioning the central government of Cameroon – was reported to have signed an act of 
accession to the Convention in 2009. ‘All that remains to be done are some administrative 
formalities and the deposit of the instrument of accession’ (“Report of the Chairman” 2009, p. 
7). The President of Cameroon signed a presidential ratification decree in May 2010.  
 
However, the actual accession still took some time due to what seemed to be organizational 
problems within the government of Cameroon. Cameroon requested the ISU for assistance in 
implementing the BWC, but still had problems depositing the instrument of accession: ‘In 
July 2011, the ISU received by e-mail from the national contact point a scanned copy of the 
accession instrument, dated 29 October 2009. Unfortunately the original instrument has not 
been deposited and apparently cannot be located by Cameroon’s authorities’ (“Status of 
Universalization” 2011, p. 7). The government of Cameroon spended 2012 trying to locate the 
original instrument of accession. State Parties such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom kept in contact with Cameroon in order to monitor Cameroon’s progress, offer 
assistance and pressure Cameroon to accede. In the end, this must have worked, since 
Cameroon acceded to the BWC in January 2013.  
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10. Analysis: international cooperation theories and State participation in the BWC  
 
In the conceptual model used for this thesis, the following factors of domestic politics were 
identified: 
• Social values & identities – preferences, especially those regarding: 
o National identity 
o Political ideology 
o Socioeconomic regulation 
• Domestic and global market position of domestic companies 
• Structure of domestic political representation 
• Limited span of attention 
• The limited capability of organizations to store and retrieve information 
• A lack of understanding 
• Problems of communication 
• Problems of uncertainty 
 
In order to answer the question to what extent New Liberalism can explain state resistance to 
and participation in the BWC, I had to look to what extent these factors of domestic politics 
could explain this.  
 
First I have looked at reasons for participation in the BWC found in scientific and 
professional literature on The Biological Weapons Convention and proliferation of biological 
weapons. It seems clear that all of the factors of domestic politics can be related to reasons for 
states not joining or joining the BWC. States that find the BWC unattractive because they fear 
joining the regime might limit their access to health sciences and biotechnology can be related 
to prevailing technological conditions and thus to the domestic and global market position of 
domestic companies. Organizational difficulties, a lack of awareness and other political 
priorities can be related to the (domestic) problems of bounded rationality, such as a lack of 
understanding and limited capabilities of organizations. 
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In the case studies I have looked more closely at the situation in three states, leading to 
different results. One could argue that Israel’s concern with national security has to do with 
particular configurations of power in the region, against which Israel is balancing. That would 
be a realist explanation for Israel’s refusal to join the BWC.  
 
Liberal theory states that a state’s concern with national security can be attributed to extreme 
conflict among, for example, ideological, institutional and material preferences. There are 
indications that this is the case. What follows from Israel position on the BWC is that Israel 
does not believe the BWC to be an effective regime. While Israel states its supports the 
objectives of the BWC and is participating in BWC meetings, it also points out that it doesn’t 
see the point of joining the BWC because it cannot trust the BWC to be effective. ‘Given the 
array of global and regional threats, and given the inability of the BTWC [BWC, AS] to 
ensure that BW will not be used by hostile states or organizations, Israel cannot assume that 
the BTWC will prevent BW use against Israel’ (Friedman 2009, p. 48).  
 
Secondly, the question can be raised whether Israel really supports the aims of the BWC? In 
other words: do Israelis (individuals and groups in Israel) believe in the world should be free 
of weapons of mass destruction? It is hard to answer that question, but the case study on Israel 
suggests that Israeli’s have a different perception of this issue than maybe many other states.  
 
Thus, these seem to be factors of domestic politics: social values & identities in Israel leading 
to specific perception regarding national security and characteristics of the regime against 
biological weapons. 
 
The lack of progress being made with the accession or ratification process of other states, 
such as Haiti, has little to do with a concern about national security and more with other 
factors of domestic politics. In the case of Haiti and Cameroon, these states are willing to 
joining the BWC following pressure by the international community – which might be 
considered a more constructivist explanation for their position – but encounter difficulties 
when they are trying to do so or have other priorities. In the case of Cameroon, the structure 
of political institutions – with the President as a strong executive – eased decision-making 
regarding accession to the BWC, but organizational problems halted the accession process, at 
least for a few years. Both in Cameroon and Haiti, there seemed to be a lack of awareness and 
more attention for other political priorities.  
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The reasons why many of these states find it hard to join the BWC can be related to problems 
of bounded rationality. What can be seen in several states is a limited span of attention, a 
limited capability to store and retrieve information, a lack of understanding of the BWC (the 
idea that states think they don’t need to join because they don’t have or join biological 
weapons), problems of communication and problems of uncertainty.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to notice that not all reasons for not joining the BWC found in 
professional and scientific literature can be translated to specific reasons belonging to 
individual states. For example, several authors as well as State Parties have mentioned the 
lack of technological and economic incentives for joining the BWC. However, when looking 
at individual cases, this reason remains implicit at best.  
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11. Concluding remarks 
 
In this research, I have tried to link theory of international cooperation to the case of 
universalization of the BWC. The conclusion of this research is that, as I believe, it is 
plausible that New Liberalism can explain state participation in and resistance to the BWC to 
a great deal. However, supplementing Moravcsik theory with problems of bounded rationality 
seems to increase the explanatory power of his theory. 
 
With the exception if the case of Israel, most reasons I have found during my research for 
states joining or not joining the BWC have to do with factors of domestic politics. In the case 
of Israel, more research should be done perceptions regarding national security and 
international cooperation in order to answer my research question more extensively.  
 
As already mentioned, ‘plausibility probes involve attempts to determine whether potential 
validity may reasonably be considered great enough to warrant the pains and costs of testing, 
which are almost always considerable, but especially so if broad, painstaking comparative 
studies are undertaken’. This thesis didn’t allow for in-depth studies of decision-making on 
participation in the BWC in each individual state, but as a probability probe it might be a 
reason for the further research that would be desirable to those who are interested in 
answering the research question of this thesis more extensively.  
 
Another point is that it might be relevant to include the concept of bounded rationality into 
research regarding state participation in the BWC. Many reasons why states do not join the 
BWC can be better explained with the help of this concept, while the three theories of 
international cooperation might have problems covering all the reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
Bibliography 
 
• Adler, E. (2013) “Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, 
and Debates”. In: Carlsnaes, A., Risse, T. and Simmons, B.A. (eds.) Handbook of 
International Relations. 2nd ed. London: SAGE. 
• Beard, J. M. (2007) “The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: 
The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention”. In: American Journal of 
International Law, 2, pp. 271-321.  
• Ben Meir, Y. and Bagno-Moldavsky, O. (2013) The Voice of the People: Israeli 
Public Opinion on National Security 2012. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security 
Studies. 
• Coe, A. “Should the United States push Israel to join the Non Proliferation Treaty?”, 
www.cfr.org. Council on Foreign Relations, 25 April 2013. Web. 1 May 2013. 
• Eckstein, H. (1992) Regarding Politics – Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and 
Change. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 
• Flyvbjerg, B. (2004) “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research”. In: Seale, 
C., Gobo, G., Gubrium, J.F. and Silverman, D. (eds.) Qualitative Research Practice, 
pp. 420-434. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
• Fulton, C.L. (2010) “Plausibility”. In: Mills, A.J., Eurepos, G. and Wiebe, E. (eds.) 
Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, vol. 1, pp. 682-683. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE. 
• George, A.L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
• Gerring, J. (2004) “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?”. In: American 
Political Science Review, 98, 2, pp. 341-354. 
• Grieco, J. (1993) “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The 
Limits of International or Neoliberal Institutional and the Future of Realist Theory”. 
In: Baldwin D.  Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, pp. 301-
338. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
• Goldblat J. (1997) “The Biological Weapons Convention – An overview”, 
www.icrc.org. International Committee of the Red Cross, 30-06-1997. Web. 14 
August 2012.  
 48 
• Gruber, L. (2000) Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational 
Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
• Haggard, S. and Simmons, B.A. (1987) “Theories of International Regimes”. In: 
International Organization, 41, 3, pp. 491-517.  
• Hopf, T. (1998) “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, 
in: International Security, 23, 1: pp 171-200. 
• Jackson, R. and Sørensen, G. (2003) Introduction to International Relations. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
• Jones, B.D. (1999) “Bounded Rationality”, in: Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 
pp. 297-321. 
• Jones, B.D. (2002) “Bounded rationality and public policy: Herbert A. Simon and the 
decisional foundations of collective choice”, in: Policy Sciences, 35: pp. 269-284. 
• Joyner, D. (2009) International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. New York: Oxford University Press.  
• Kahler, M. (1998) “Rationality in International Relations”, in: International 
Organization, 52, 4: pp. 919-941. 
• Keohane, R.O. (1983) “The Demand for International Regimes”, in: Krasner, S.D. 
(ed.) International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
• Keohane, R.O. (1986) Neorealism and its Critics. New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press. 
• Keohane, R.O. (1988), “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, in: International 
Studies Quarterly, 32, 4: pp. 379-396. 
• Keohane, R.O. (1995) “The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-
American Research Programme”, in: Rittberger, V. (ed.) Regime Theory and 
International Relations, pp. 23-48. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
• Keohane, R.O. (2005) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy. First Princeton Classic Edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
• Krasner, S. (1995) “Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights”, in: Rittberger, V. (ed.) 
Regime Theory and International Relations, pp. 139-167. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
• Littlewood, J. (2005) The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution. 
Hampshire: Ashgate. 
 49 
• Malik, A. (2004) Technology and Security in the 21st Century: A Demand-side 
Perspective. SIPRI Research Report No. 20. New York: Oxford University Press. 
• March, J.G. (1978): “Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of 
Choice”, in: The Bell Journal of Economics, 9/2: pp. 587-608. 
• March, J.G. (1995) A Primer on Decision Making – How Decisions Happen. New 
York, NY: The Free Press. 
• Mearsheimer, J. J. (1995) “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War” in Brown, M.E., Lynn-Jones, S.M. and Miller, S.E. (eds.) The Perils of Anarchy, 
pp. 78-129. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
• Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton.  
• Meier, O. (2012) “Don’t neglect the Biological Weapons Convention”, 
www.armscontrolnow.org. The Arms Control Association, 12 Januari 2012. Web 5 
August 2012.  
• Moodie M. (2009) “Regional Perspectives on Arms Control”, in: Larsen, J. A., and 
James J. Wirtz (eds.) Arms Control and Cooperative Security, pp. 149-174. London: 
Boulder. 
• Moravcsik, A. (1992, rev. 1993) “Liberalism and International Relations Theory”. 
Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series 92-6. Harvard University.  
• Moravcsik, A. (1997) “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics”, in: International Organization, 51, 4: pp. 513-53.  
• Moravcsik, A. (2008) “The New Liberalism”. In: Reus-Smit, C. and Snidal, D. (eds.) 
The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
• Moravcsik, A. (2010) “Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer”. 
Unpublished. Available via http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/publications.html 
(June 2012). 
• Morgenthau, H.J. (1960) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
3rd edn. New York: Knopf. 
• Pearson, G.S. “The Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention is Within Reach”, 
www.armscontrol.org. The Arms Control Association, June 2000. Web. 1 May 2013. 
• Pecquet, J. “UN approval of arms trade treaty sets up Obama, Senate showdown”, 
www.thehill.com. The Hill, 4 February 2013. Web. 10 May 2013.  
• Sagan, S. D. (1996/1997), ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in 
Search of a Bomb’, in: International Security, 21, 3: pp. 54-86.  
 50 
• Simon, H.A. (1983) Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
• Simon, H.A. (1985) “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with 
Political Science”, in: The American Political Science Review, 79/2: pp. 293-394. 
• Simon, H. A. (1997) Models of Bounded Rationality. Volume 3. Empirically Grounded 
Economic Reason. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
• Sims, J.E. (2009) “The Changing Domestic Politicis of the Arms Control Process”, in: 
Larsen, J. A., and James J. Wirtz (eds.) Arms Control and Cooperative Security, 
London: Boulder. 
• Sitaraman, S. (2009) State Participation in International Treaty Regimes. Surrey, 
Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
• Snidal, D. (1985) “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory”, in: International 
Organization, 39: pp. 579-614. 
• Spector, L.S. (2009) “The Furue of the Nonproliferation Regime”, in: Larsen, J. A., 
and James J. Wirtz (eds.) Arms Control and Cooperative Security, London: Boulder. 
• Stein, A.A. (1982) “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World”, 
in: International Regimes, springs 1982: pp. 299-324. 
• Stein, A.A. (1990) Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International 
Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
• Tannenwald, N. (2007) The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of 
Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
• Takeyh, R. “Iran’s nuclear diversion”, in: The Washington Post, November 5, 2009. 
• Viotti, P. R. and Kauppi, M. V. (2011, cop. 2012) International Relations Theory. 
Boston, MA [etc.]: Longman/Pearson Education. 
• Waltz, K.N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addision-Wesley. 
• Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
• Wilson, K (2006) “Standing the test of time – efforts to achieve universality of the 
CWC”. In: Tkahur, R. and Haru. E. (eds.) The Chemical Weapons Convention: 
Implementation, Challenges and Opportunities. Hong Kong: United Nations 
University Press. 
 
 
 
